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Abstract 
 
The term ‘risk appetite’ is used widely and increasingly, but there is no commonly 
accepted definition for it. This situation is exacerbated by confusion between risk 
appetite and other risk-related terms, especially risk attitude. 
 
This paper offers a consistent and coherent taxonomy of these terms, showing how 
they relate to one another. This allows development of a rich model to explain the 
complementary and central roles of both risk appetite and risk attitude when 
individuals or organisations decide how much risk can be taken in a risky and 
important situation. 
 
By progressively deconstructing the full model, we conclude that the key step is to set 
risk thresholds. We derive a three-stage approach to setting risk thresholds that 
ensures that the outcomes properly reflect organisational risk culture and the 
individual risk propensities of key stakeholders, and also clarifies the essential role of 
risk attitude as a control point. This enables individuals and organisations to choose 
the appropriate risk attitude in order to influence the amount of risk that is taken in 
any given situation, so that the achievement of objectives is optimised. 
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. 
Defining risk appetite 
 
Senior management teams and boards are constantly confronted with the need to 
answer one key question: ‘How much risk is too much risk?’. This has led in the past 
decade to an emergent and extensive interest in the idea of risk appetite and its 
influence on organisational decision-making at all levels from the strategic to the 
tactical. 
 
Recent research on risk appetite (Association of Insurance and Risk Managers 2009) 
has identified four ways in which an understanding and expression of risk appetite can 
be used within organisations: 
1. To support strategy-setting, leading to a balanced risk profile and 
identification of which risks to avoid and which to take 
2. To support effective management of risk, by ensuring that risk management 
resources are allocated optimally, and fostering a risk-aware culture across the 
organisation 
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3. To set appropriate boundaries for risk taking, by motivating decisionmakers 
to make better and more consistent decisions 
4. To maximise stakeholder value, by enhancing organisational performance and 
delivery. 
 
But what exactly is risk appetite? There have been a number of recent attempts to 
define risk appetite and outline its practical significance to business: 
• International standard ISO Guide 73:2009 includes a normative definition of 
risk appetite as ‘amount and type of risk that an organisation is prepared to 
seek, accept or tolerate’. This is reflected in other risk standards such as 
ISO31000:2009, BS31100:2011 and the UK Office of Government Commerce 
‘Management of Risk’ (M_o_R) guidance (OGC 2010). 
• Professional risk bodies such as the UK Association of Insurance and Risk 
Managers (AIRMIC), the Institute of Operational Risk (IOR) and the Institute 
of Risk Management (IRM) have each issued advice to their members aiming 
to clarify the meaning of the term and how it should be used in practice 
(AIRMIC 2009; IOR 2009; IRM 2011). 
• Corporate governance guidelines refer to the need for organisations to define 
and communicate their risk appetite, with the new UK Corporate Governance 
Code stating that: ‘The board is responsible for determining the nature and 
extent of the significant risk it is willing to take in achieving its strategic 
objectives’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2010). Similarly, the US National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) Blue Ribbon Commission issued 
their ‘Report on Risk Governance: Balancing Risk and Reward’ in October 
2009, stating that ‘The Board of Directors need to understand the 
organization’s risk appetite and level of risk tolerance. The assessment of the 
company’s risk appetite should be an ongoing process, considering that risks 
facing the company are constantly changing’ (NACD 2009). 
• Consultancy firms have undertaken research and offered guidance to clients on 
the subject (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008; KPMG 2008; Towers Perrin 
2009), perhaps seeing a new business opportunity to provide advice and 
support. 
 
Academics have also been considering the topic, mostly in journals dedicated to 
economics and investment theory (see, for example, Kumar & Persaud 2002). This 
work builds on a rich vein of research from risk psychology and behavioural 
economics, to address the influence of risk perception on decision choices under 
uncertainty (for example, Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahnemann 1981; 
Sitkin & Pablo 1992; Sitkin & Weingart 1995; Weber & Milliman 1997). 
 
Despite the growing and continuing interest in the subject of risk appetite, there is still 
no consensus on its meaning or practical application. The situation is made worse by 
the loose use of other risk-related terms, some of which are used interchangeably with 
risk appetite. These include: risk attitude, risk capacity, risk culture, risk exposure, 
risk perception, risk preference, risk propensity, risk threshold and risk tolerance. 
Existing academic and practitioner sources do not clearly define how these terms 
might differ, overlap, replace or relate to each other. 
 
This paper dispels the confusion by providing a clear definition of risk appetite and 
distinguishing it from related terms. We also have a broader reason for considering 
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risk appetite, namely, to explore how it influences decision-making in situations 
perceived as risky and important. Our previous work has addressed the role of risk 
attitude in such decision-making (Hillson & Murray-Webster 2007; Murray-Webster 
& Hillson 2008). 
 
In this paper, we propose a new model in which both risk appetite and risk attitude act 
as mediating factors between a wide range of inputs and key outcomes. The model is 
supported by a consistent and coherent taxonomy of risk-related terms, and clarifies 
how these relate to each other. We also suggest practical ways in which people and 
organisations can work with these concepts to ensure that they make appropriate 
decisions in risky and important situations. 
 
The centrality of risk appetite and risk attitude 
 
There is one key decision to make in risky and important situations, namely, how 
much risk to take. This deceptively simple question is actually very complex to 
answer. It depends on a wide range of related factors, some of which are internal to 
the decisionmakers as individuals and groups, and others that exist externally and 
independently of people. In addition, some of those factors can be influenced or 
determined by the choices of the people involved, whereas others exist independent of 
human choice. 
 
Within this complex set of interacting factors, our contention is that two play a key 
central role, namely risk appetite and risk attitude. We propose a model showing the 
central importance of risk appetite and risk attitude, the ‘RARA Model’, presented in 
Figure 1, which also illustrates the relationships between the other risk-related 
concepts in this space. This model is supported by a taxonomy of terms in the 
Appendix, which describes the key relationships between these concepts. 
 
The following sections detail our explanation of the RARA Model, including the 
implications for appropriate risk taking. 
 
Introducing the RARA Model 
 
The RARA Model in Figure 1 is centred on the two key concepts of risk appetite and 
risk attitude. The left-hand side shows a range of inputs to these two central items, 
with outcomes shown on the right-hand side. Risk appetite and risk attitude appear as 
mediating factors between inputs and outcomes. 
 
We distinguish in the model between factors that are held internally within people 
(shaded in Figure 1) and those that exist externally to people and can therefore be 
more easily observed and measured (unshaded). 
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Figure 1. The Risk Appetite — Risk Attitude (RARA) Model 
 
The RARA Model also separates factors that exist independently of human choice or 
decision (shown in bold italic text in Figure 1) and those that are (explicitly or 
implicitly) chosen (normal text). These distinctions are clarified in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. RARA Model concepts 
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To understand the RARA Model, it is necessary to start with risk appetite and risk 
attitude. These two concepts are often confused and seen as overlapping or even 
synonymous, but we argue that they are essentially different in nature. Both risk 
appetite and risk attitude are internal factors, i.e. they are held within people and can 
only be seen through some external expression or behaviour. 
 
However, the fundamental difference is that the risk appetite of an individual or group 
exists as a tendency independently of human choice, but that the risk attitude of an 
individual or group is a chosen response. 
 
It is important to remember that risk appetite and risk attitude do not and cannot exist 
in isolation. They both only exist in relation to an external situation, which is 
perceived as both risky and important, and which demands some sort of response by 
individuals and/or groups. As a result, the situation appears as the initiating trigger on 
the left-hand side of the RARA Model. The situation usually gives rise to a set of 
chosen objectives that an individual or group wish to achieve in that situation, 
although these objectives may be more or less well-defined or expressed. The 
inherent risk exposure associated with the situation and its objectives also exists 
independently of people; in other words, risk exists in the situation irrespective of 
whether anyone is aware of it or not. 
 
The left-hand side of Figure 1 describes the input factors to risk appetite and risk 
attitude. All these input factors exist independent of human choice or decision, with 
the exception of the objectives to be achieved in a given situation, which are typically 
chosen consciously by individuals or a group. 
 
Risk appetite is influenced by the external objectives of the situation in combination 
with two other factors. The first is the propensity of individuals to act in a certain way 
in the face of risk (risk propensity), driven by their risk-related personality traits (risk 
preferences). The second factor is the culture of the group or organisation in relation 
to risk (risk culture). Because all of these factors are pre-existing and uninfluenced, 
risk appetite arises inherently within an individual or group, without conscious 
intervention or choice, which is why we describe it as a tendency. 
 
In contrast, risk attitude is a chosen response to the situation and its objectives, 
influenced by perception of the inherent risk exposure (risk perception) that, in turn, 
is influenced by a wide range of factors. The choice of risk attitude may be made 
consciously/explicitly or subconsciously/implicitly, but the ability to choose a 
different risk attitude always remains a possibility. In our earlier work (Hillson & 
Murray-Webster 2007; Murray-Webster & Hillson 2008), we categorised the 
influences on risk perception into three groups: 
1. Conscious situational factors; 
2. Subconscious mental shortcuts; 
3. Affective feelings and emotions. 
 
These three groups of factors are tightly interwoven in practice, forming a ‘triple 
strand’ of influences that takes conscious effort and awareness to untangle. Without 
awareness, the perception of the risky situation will lead to an implicit or tacit choice 
of risk attitude that might generate inappropriate actions. Awareness of the triple 
strand, on the other hand, can produce an appropriate chosen risk attitude that 
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properly reflects the perceived level of risk and leads to suitable actions. In either 
case, risk attitude is a choice. This is a vital feature of the RARA Model, since it 
represents the first place in the model where conscious intervention is possible. We 
will return to this feature later to explore its significance for decision-making in risky 
and important situations. 
 
The right-hand side of the RARA Model in Figure 1 presents outcomes that explain 
how risk appetite and risk attitude come together in practice as mediating factors to 
influence the decision on how much risk to accept in risky and important situations. 
We should note that all of the outcomes on the right-hand side are external factors 
(unshaded) that can, therefore, be observed and measured. 
 
It is important to recognise that risk appetite is intangible and cannot be measured 
directly. It is, therefore, necessary to have some proxy by which this intangible 
tendency can be expressed. This is illustrated by the analogy of physical appetite or 
hunger, which cannot be directly quantified. Instead, we use figures of speech to 
express physical appetite. In response to the question ‘How hungry are you?’ we 
might answer, ‘I could eat a horse’ or perhaps ‘I fancy a doughnut’. These quantified 
expressions are not direct statements of appetite, but instead allow us to assess it 
through a measurable proxy. 
 
In the same way, risk appetite requires a proxy measure. The RARA Model gives this 
role to risk thresholds, which are the expression of a risk appetite in ways that can be 
measured externally and objectively. The RARA Model also indicates that risk 
thresholds are the point at which risk appetite meets risk attitude. This is an important 
intersection that we will return to below. 
 
We define risk thresholds as the quantified measures that represent upper and lower 
limits of acceptable tolerance around objectives. Some organisations choose to use the 
term risk tolerance as an alternative to risk thresholds. Either is acceptable in our 
view, since risk tolerance indicates upper and lower limits of variability around a risk 
threshold. 
 
We suggest that risk thresholds are derived from risk appetite (the tendency to take 
risk in the situation) and are influenced by the chosen risk attitudes of stakeholders 
(the chosen positioning in relation to the risk exposure inherent in that situation). For 
risk thresholds to be appropriate in a situation, they should be validated against risk 
capacity, which we define as the ability of an entity to bear risk, quantified against 
objectives. 
 
The ideal situation is for risk thresholds to be set that properly reflect both the 
inherent risk appetite of the organisation and the chosen risk attitude in a given 
situation. This alignment will maximise the chances for the organisation to achieve its 
objectives by taking the right amount of risk consistent with the desired outcomes. 
What happens if risk appetite and risk attitude are not aligned? We argue that in these 
circumstances a control loop is required in order to support the necessary corrective 
behaviour. Lack of alignment will lead to inappropriate risk thresholds, with the 
organisation eventually taking on too much or too little risk. This, in turn, is likely to 
lead to unacceptable risk exposure or inadequate performance because actions are 
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inconsistent with the objectives of the situation. But where can remedial control be 
exercised within the RARA Model presented in Figure 1? 
 
There is only one control point in the model, which is to modify risk attitude. This is 
because risk attitude is chosen and that choice leads to action. Therefore, the control 
mechanism to judge whether the chosen risk attitude is appropriate in a situation is to 
check the effect of risk actions and the residual risk exposure against the risk 
thresholds and then to adjust the choice of risk attitude as necessary to create the 
necessary alignment for the action to lead to appropriate outcomes in the situation. 
 
Risk appetite and risk attitude in action 
 
In this section, we demonstrate how risk appetite and risk attitude function within the 
RARA Model. They can be considered as separate constructs since each has a 
particular influence on the final outcomes, yet they must be addressed in combination 
if they are to have a positive effect on individual and organisational decision-making 
in risky and important situations. The best way to illustrate the contribution of risk 
appetite or risk attitude is to consider how the RARA Model might work in their 
absence. In particular, we explore how an organisation might set its risk thresholds in 
three different scenarios: 
1. Unmanaged, where risk thresholds are set by the organisation with no 
reference to risk appetite or risk attitude. 
2. Constrained, where risk thresholds are consciously modified by the inherent 
risk appetite. 
3. Informed, taking account of the chosen risk attitudes of key stakeholders as 
well as wider organisational factors when setting risk thresholds. 
 
These three scenarios are outlined below, together with an illustrative example that is 
based on a real case but one that has been modified for simplicity. 
 
The Unmanaged Scenario 
 
Figure 3 shows what happens when both risk appetite and risk attitude are removed 
from the RARA Model, which we call the Unmanaged Scenario. A situation arises 
that is perceived as risky and important and, from this situation, one or more 
objectives are derived by key individuals, or by a decision-making group. There is, of 
course, a certain level of inherent risk exposure associated with this situation, but this 
is not explicitly considered in the Unmanaged Scenario. Having set objectives, the 
organisation then proceeds to set risk thresholds to quantify how much risk is 
acceptable in the given situation in order to optimise the chances of achieving the 
objectives. These risk thresholds are validated against the overall risk capacity of the 
organisation and modified if necessary. Risk actions may be implemented to control 
the perceived level of residual risk exposure, and the results of these actions are 
compared with the risk thresholds to determine whether they are working adequately. 
 
At first sight, there appears to be nothing wrong with the sequence of events in the 
Unmanaged Scenario. It describes a set of actions that most decision-making groups 
would recognise as familiar. However, there is a problem with following this scenario 
to set risk thresholds. Since inherent risk exposure is not explicitly considered in the 
Unmanaged Scenario, there is no way of determining whether the selected risk 
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thresholds are appropriate. The organisation recognises that it needs to set risk 
thresholds in order to indicate how much risk the organisation is prepared to accept in 
the given situation, and so they are set somehow, perhaps intuitively. But it is not 
possible to know if the chosen risk thresholds are appropriate, without considering the 
wider context of the decision. It is possible that the unmanaged approach might result 
in suitable risk thresholds being set, but this outcome would be more the result of 
good luck than good judgement, and is not guaranteed. 
 
In Figure 3 all the boxes are unshaded, indicating that these are external factors that 
exist independent of people. In the Unmanaged Scenario, inputs result in outcomes, 
but without the mediating factors that take explicit account of the internal workings of 
individuals or groups. Instead, this approach is only influenced by what can be seen 
and measured. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Unmanaged Scenario 
 
As an example of this scenario, consider the behaviour of an analyst who recently 
joined a leading oil company to conduct economic appraisals. The analyst developed 
an economic value model for a new exploration prospect using current industry norms 
and established algorithms, and the model returned a positive result that exceeded all 
the company’s hurdle rates. As a result, the analyst recommended that the company 
should proceed with the investment. The analyst proposed risk thresholds set at the 
standard values used for previous similar prospects, and suggested a routine and 
proven development strategy that was expected to maintain an acceptable level of risk 
exposure. 
 
The analyst’s recommendations were submitted to an investment appraisal panel for 
approval. We might expect that they would be accepted, since due process was 
followed in a transparent and traceable manner. However, there is no guarantee that 
simply following a proven analytical approach produced the right outcome. Other 
factors need to be considered if the optimal result is to be achieved. 
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The Constrained Scenario 
 
This scenario is shown in Figure 4, which adds risk appetite back into the picture, 
together with its influencing inputs. 
 
In the Constrained Scenario it is clear that risk thresholds are not just choices made in 
isolation from their context, determined only by the desired objectives in a given 
situation. Instead, there is a range of internal factors that should influence the chosen 
risk thresholds. These are required to ensure that the amount of risk considered 
acceptable by the organisation properly reflects both the risk culture of the 
organisation and the risk propensity of key stakeholders. Both risk culture and risk 
propensity come together in the internal tendency that we call risk appetite. As an 
internal factor, risk appetite is intangible and cannot be measured explicitly, unless 
and until it is expressed via risk thresholds. 
 
 
Figure 4. The Constrained Scenario 
 
We can illustrate this by returning to our oil company analyst’s recommendations for 
the exploration prospect. When these were submitted to the investment appraisal 
panel, the panel members challenged the risk thresholds that had arisen from the 
analysis. On closer inspection, it appeared that these failed to take account of the 
company’s position on safety and environmental issues, and consequently the risk 
thresholds were too high. These issues were the result of previous incidents in the 
company’s history that had led to changes in company culture of which the newly 
appointed analyst was unaware. 
 
Simple analysis of a situation in isolation is not sufficient to determine how much risk 
should be taken by an organisation in a given situation that is risky and important. 
Instead, it is necessary to take account of organisational risk culture and personal risk 
propensities, which shape the risk appetite of the decision-making group. These are 
 38 
commonly expressed as ‘The way we do things here’, and they form an important 
overlay to the unmanaged calculation of risk thresholds. 
 
The explicit inclusion of risk appetite in the process of determining risk thresholds 
avoids the problem of setting levels of acceptable risk that are inconsistent with 
company values, history or norms and which are, therefore, inappropriate in the 
organisational context. It does not, however, take account of the desire of the 
organisation or key stakeholders to take risk, since risk appetite is an internal 
tendency driven by other intangible factors. As a result, the setting of risk thresholds 
is still intuitive and unmanaged. In the Constrained Scenario, risk thresholds are 
influenced by risk appetite, and can later be modified consciously by reference to risk 
capacity, but there is no point in Figure 4 at which intervention is possible to 
influence where the risk thresholds are initially set. Something else is required. 
 
The Informed Scenario 
 
It is clearly important to take proper account of risk appetite when setting risk 
thresholds, which the Constrained Scenario does, but this is not the whole story. In 
every case, it is people who take decisions on what level of risk exposure is 
appropriate, working either as individuals or in groups. Despite claims to the contrary, 
people are not dispassionate rational actors who make decisions based on perfect 
economic utility calculations. Instead we bring a range of overt and hidden influences 
to our decision-making, including subconscious cognitive biases and psychological 
heuristics, as well as affective emotional factors. It is not possible to set appropriate 
risk thresholds without considering these influences on our perception of risk that, in 
turn, affect individual and group risk attitude. It is, therefore, necessary to add risk 
attitude back into the picture, producing the Informed Scenario, which brings us back 
to the full RARA Model (see Figure 4, repeating Figure 1). 
 
In the case of our oil company example, the exploration and development opportunity 
was pursued following the investment appraisal panel, and a project team was 
appointed with clear objectives and a set of well-defined risk thresholds. However, as 
the project proceeded, it became clear that the team’s actions were in danger of 
breaching the risk thresholds. On investigation, a range of subtle influences were 
uncovered that led to risk-taking behaviour, including the previous experience of key 
team members, peer pressure to perform, the financial incentive of potential bonus 
payments for successful delivery, and a strong macho, can-do culture among the team. 
This led to a risky shift in the way the team operated, with an inappropriate level of 
risk seeking. A new project leader was appointed, who had strong interpersonal skills 
and well-developed emotional literacy, and who was able to modify the team’s 
attitude and approach to risk taking and bring the project back into line. 
 
This illustrates the importance of hidden sources of bias in this area. If these remain 
unmanaged, they can lead to adoption of risk attitudes that hinder achievement of the 
desired objectives. Instead, we need to aim for managed risk attitudes to align 
behaviour and actions with the risk thresholds that have been set for a given situation. 
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Figure 5 (repeating Figure 1). The Informed Scenario 
 
The Informed Scenario (Figure 5) illustrates the full RARA Model, which includes 
the influence of risk attitude alongside risk appetite, showing how managed risk 
attitude offers a point of choice and intervention in the decision-making process. The 
‘risk attitude–risk actions–risk evaluation’ control loop allows the chosen risk attitude 
to be changed in order to keep actions in line with risk thresholds. As a result, we can 
reach optimal alignment of risk thresholds with objectives, internal coherence with 
risk culture and maximum effectiveness of risk actions. 
 
So what? Implications for practice 
 
So far in this paper, we have defined a range of risk-related constructs and shown how 
they relate to each other, as well as describing the part they each play in decision-
making in risky and important situations. The RARA Model provides a holistic and 
integrated framework for individuals, teams and organisations to use when answering 
questions such as ‘Is my behaviour appropriate in this risky situation?’, ‘How much 
risk should we take?’ or ‘Does our risk culture support our strategy and objectives?’. 
 
This section expands our description of the RARA Model in order to make it useful to 
practitioners. We particularly elaborate on two key assertions: 
1. Some risk-related constructs exist independently outside people and in the 
external environment, and hence can be observed and/or measured. 
2. Other risk-related constructs are intangible and they cannot be measured 
directly; they can only be observed through actions or proxy measures. 
 
As above, we achieve this expanded discussion by considering the three possible 
scenarios in turn, incrementally adding risk appetite and risk attitude back into the 
unmanaged version of the RARA Model. In doing so, we expose further how the 
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loose use of nomenclature has created confusion in knowing what can be objectively 
defined and measured, and what cannot. 
 
We then build further on this analysis in the penultimate section by suggesting a 
practical process for making appropriate risk-informed decisions. 
 
The Unmanaged Scenario: only tangible factors 
 
As shown in Figure 3, all the variables in the Unmanaged Scenario are external 
factors, existing outside of individual people or a collective group. Some of these are 
pre-existing un-chosen factors (the situation itself, the risk capacity of the 
organisation and the inherent risk exposure associated with the situation). Others are 
chosen by people (the objectives in the situation, the risk thresholds and tolerances 
selected, risk evaluation criteria and risk actions). All the factors in the Unmanaged 
Scenario can be explicitly observed or articulated. Risk actions can be observed; 
objectives, risk thresholds, risk tolerances and risk evaluation criteria can be 
expressed in tangible terms; and risk capacity can be calculated based on the assets of 
the organisation. 
 
Because all the factors in the Unmanaged Scenario are visible and measurable, it 
appears deceptively simple to set risk thresholds using this approach. However, the 
failure to take proper account of the other factors in the RARA Model, particularly the 
central mediating factors of risk appetite and risk attitude, means that the resulting 
risk thresholds are likely to be flawed. If the ‘right result’ is achieved, then it probably 
arose more by good luck than good judgement. 
 
The Constrained Scenario: factors with proxy measures 
 
The Unmanaged Scenario is developed into the Constrained Scenario by the addition 
of risk appetite and its precedents (risk preferences, risk propensity and risk culture), 
as described in Figure 4. These factors put the Unmanaged Scenario into its proper 
context, allowing a link to be made between the risk thresholds and factors that exist 
independent of the specific situation. 
 
Existing work on risk preferences, risk propensity and risk culture indicate how these 
might be assessed and/or measured. 
 
Risk preferences of individuals (as innate motivations) can be determined through 
personality tests, such as the Spony Profiling Model (Spony 2003), or the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (Briggs-Myers 1980). Such instruments allow an individual to 
diagnose and reflect upon their likely starting point when faced with a risky and 
important situation. Although some decision scientists argue that risk taking is a 
rational, economic process, by which human beings are able to compute potential 
gains and losses and decide objectively (e.g. Dyer & Sarin 1982; Davies 2006), others 
argue that there are other, more subjective, situational influences on risk propensity 
(e.g. Sitkin & Pablo 1992; Lopes 1987; Sitkin & Weingart 1995). There is certainly 
no single, reliable diagnostic that can be used to determine the risk preferences or 
propensity of individual decisionmakers; indeed, the fact that these constructs are 
tendencies should warn us against trying to be overly analytical about them. 
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Risk preferences and risk propensity apply to individuals, yet individuals rarely make 
decisions in a vacuum. Individuals form decision-making groups such as families, 
project teams, company boards, and so on. Groups, particularly long-established ones 
such as companies, will tend to adopt tendencies of how to respond to risk and this 
collective tendency is referred to as the group’s risk culture. For example, one 
organisation’s risk culture might always be to consider how avoid loss, while another 
might view risk as an opportunity to maximise value. Again, some diagnostics exist 
that attempt to measure risk culture, although even in the better diagnostics, risk 
culture is often used interchangeably with risk attitude, incorrectly in our view (e.g. 
Underwood & Ingram 2010). 
 
Risk preferences, propensity and culture are important influential factors when 
considering risk appetite, but they are not directly observable. Instead, they are 
internal tendencies that can be assessed to some degree through the use of diagnostics 
at an individual or group level. Rather than trying to measure these tendencies per se, 
it is more important to consider how each may be affecting risk appetite and the 
resulting risk thresholds. 
 
The Informed Scenario: factors understood and controlled with hindsight 
 
In the Constrained Scenario, externally measurable factors in the RARA Model are 
supplemented by an understanding of the factors that influence risk appetite. Although 
diagnostics exist that seek to evaluate such tendencies, these have use only insofar as 
they can alert the decisionmaker. In the Informed Scenario, by contrast, the mediating 
factor of risk attitude is introduced. We define this term very precisely as a chosen 
response to risk, influenced by perception. Crucially, risk attitude is a situational 
phenomenon. It cannot be measured directly, but it can be understood and judged as 
appropriate or inappropriate during decision-making in a specific, risky and important 
situation. The triple strand of influences on risk perception and risk attitude shown in 
Figure 1 can all be reflected upon and understood, either in isolation or, more 
importantly, as a combined effect, but this is not meaningful out of the context of the 
specific situation. In a specific situation, risk attitude (how a person or group will 
respond to the perceived risks) can be evaluated and modified using the Six As model 
(Murray-Webster & Hillson 2008), shown in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6. The Six As Model 
Based on Murray-Webster & Hillson 2008, used with permission 
 
The Six As model provides a structured framework to help individuals and groups 
adopt an appropriate risk attitude in any given risky and important situation. The 
model is described in detail elsewhere (Murray-Webster & Hillson 2008), but it can 
be summarised as follows: 
• First, there is a need for awareness and appreciation of the current risk 
attitude adopted by an individual or a group, including the ‘triple strand’ key 
influences. 
• Next comes assessment, to determine whether the unmanaged risk attitude is 
likely to lead to an acceptable outcome or not. 
• Where the assessment step indicates that intervention is required to modify the 
prevailing risk attitude, assertion and action are employed to make the 
necessary change. 
• If, on the other hand, assessment shows that the existing risk attitude is 
appropriate, the current risk attitude can be accepted. 
• Whether the unmanaged risk attitude is accepted or modified, the ongoing 
situation must be monitored and reassessed periodically to determine whether 
intervention may be required at a later time. 
 
Each of these steps involves a range of underlying actions, and this paper cannot 
cover the full detail. Instead, we have shown how ‘chosen risk attitude’ works 
alongside the other risk-related elements of the RARA Model to provide a control 
loop that can be activated to modify risk attitude where necessary, influencing both 
the level at which risk thresholds are set and the nature of future risk actions. Since 
risk appetite is an internal and independent tendency not influenced by human choice, 
it cannot act in this modifying way, leaving our ability to choose an appropriate risk 
attitude as the sole control point available to us. 
 
As we have seen, some risk-related constructs exist independently outside people and 
in the external environment, and hence these can be observed and/or measured. These 
constructs are those that make up the starting point when considering how much risk 
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is too much risk: the elements of the Unmanaged Scenario. The other risk-related 
constructs that allow the Unmanaged Scenario to progress through to an informed 
judgement are intangible and they cannot be measured directly; they can only be 
observed through actions or proxy measures. 
 
We argue that the control point in the process is achieved by comparing the objective 
expression of risk thresholds with the evaluation of residual risk, and modifying risk 
attitude as necessary to ensure that residual risk is matched with thresholds so that the 
situation poses neither too much nor too little risk. 
 
Using the RARA Model for risk-informed decisions 
 
This section uses the RARA Model in order to demonstrate how individuals and 
groups in risky and important situations can make appropriate risk-informed 
decisions. This is achieved by considering the three possible scenarios in turn, starting 
with the outcome arising from the unmanaged version of the RARA Model, then 
incrementally adding risk appetite and risk attitude. 
 
Moving through the scenarios 
 
There is one key question for any individual, organisation or decision-making group 
facing a risky and important situation. Which is the best approach to adopt in order to 
determine the ‘right’ risk thresholds? Clearly, it is not safe to rely on the Unmanaged 
Scenario (Figure 3), since this produces risk thresholds based on gut reaction and 
intuition, taking no account of the organisational risk culture or the risk propensities 
of key stakeholders. As a minimum, we need to consider the norms of ‘the way we do 
things here’, as illustrated in the Constrained Scenario (Figure 4). But we have shown 
that even this is not sufficient to ensure that risk thresholds are set in an appropriate 
level. Instead, we need to actively adopt a risk attitude that reflects our chosen 
response to the perceived risk exposure which will, in turn, influence where we decide 
to set our risk thresholds, as shown in the Informed Scenario (Figure 5). 
 
In order to make this process explicit, we recommend that risk thresholds should be 
set in a progressive manner, moving through the three scenarios. Initially, risk 
thresholds are produced and recorded without reference to any factors other than what 
can be described and measured (Unmanaged). These risk thresholds are then modified 
to take account of the risk appetite that arises from the organisational risk culture and 
the risk propensities of key stakeholders (Constrained). A final refinement to the risk 
thresholds is then made to reflect the chosen risk attitude (Informed). This final step 
can be achieved by recognising that risk attitude is a central mediating factor, 
alongside risk appetite. We have also seen that the ability for individuals and groups 
to choose a risk attitude provides a vital control point in the process of setting risk 
thresholds, and the Six As model (Figure 6) provides a practical approach to facilitate 
the appropriate choice of risk attitude. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our previous work together has focused on the promotion and encouragement of 
‘appropriate’ risk-taking (Hillson & Murray-Webster 2007; Murray-Webster & 
Hillson 2008). The understanding of what is meant by ‘appropriate’ is of course both 
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subjective and situational, and it depends on the people involved as well as the 
circumstances. Behaviour towards risk is determined by the underlying risk attitude, 
which itself is dependent on risk perception, and there is a range of factors that 
influence perception of risk (the ‘triple strand’ of conscious, subconscious and 
affective factors). We have shown previously that risk attitude is a choice, and that it 
is possible to use a managed approach to choose appropriate risk attitudes in order to 
optimise both the decision-making process and the decision outcome. 
 
This paper extends our earlier work on risk attitude, to put these ideas of managed 
choices in risky and important situations into the wider context, particularly in terms 
of risk appetite. In showing how risk appetite and risk attitude are separate yet 
complementary ideas, we have also produced a complete and integrated taxonomy 
and framework of a wider set of risk-related concepts and terms (summarised in the 
Appendix below). 
 
Most importantly for practitioners, the RARA Model indicates how both risk appetite 
and risk attitude influence the setting of risk thresholds. Progressively deconstructing 
this model has revealed a three-step process that allows informed risk taking when 
determining what risk thresholds are appropriate in a given situation. This process 
starts by taking account of external and visible factors to generate an initial set of risk 
thresholds, without conscious consideration of the hidden influences (the Unmanaged 
Scenario). This is then augmented and modified by taking account of the pre-existing 
tendencies of the individual and the organisation in relation to risk (risk propensities 
and risk culture), which produces an intangible risk appetite that modifies the first-cut 
risk thresholds (the Constrained Scenario). Finally, a further refinement of risk 
thresholds is achieved through active adoption of the desirable risk attitude in order to 
optimise the achievement of objectives given the level of risk exposure (the Informed 
Scenario), using the Six As framework to manage risk attitude proactively. 
 
Our exploration started by considering the ill-defined concept of risk appetite, but it 
has led to a framework that clearly defines the different roles of a range of risk-related 
factors and how they interact. Applying the approach outlined in this paper offers 
individuals and organisations a practical way of ensuring that they take the right risks 
safely, setting measurable risk thresholds that reflect the inherent risk appetite while 
also adopting the most appropriate risk attitude. 
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Appendix: Taxonomy of risk-related terms 
 
DEFINITIONS 
 
Risk: Uncertainty that matters 
Risk actions: Actions taken to respond to risk exposure. 
Risk appetite: Tendency of an individual or group to take risk in a given situation.  
Risk attitude: Chosen response of an individual or group to a given risky situation, influenced by risk 
perception. 
Risk capacity: Ability of an entity to bear risk, quantified against objectives. 
Risk culture: Shared beliefs, values and knowledge of a group about risk. 
Risk exposure: A measure of the overall effect of identified risks on objectives. Risk exposure may be 
expressed quantitatively or qualitatively. Inherent risk exposure is the level of risk exposure that 
exists before risk actions have been implemented. Residual risk exposure is the level of risk exposure 
remaining after agreed risk actions have been implemented. 
Risk perception: View of risky situation by individual or group, influenced by ‘triple strand’ 
(conscious, subconscious and affective) factors. 
Risk preference: Those aspects of an individual’s personality and motivation that influence their risk 
propensity. 
Risk propensity: Tendency of an individual to take risk in general, informed by inherent risk 
preferences. 
Risk thresholds: Quantified measures that represent upper and lower limits of acceptable tolerance 
around objectives. 
Risk tolerance: The acceptable variance around a risk threshold, expressed as upper and lower limits, 
measured against an objective. 
 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Individuals are characterised by a general propensity to take risk (risk propensity), reflecting their 
inherent risk preferences. 
Organisations have a shared risk culture reflecting their shared approach to risk. 
A situation arises within which individuals and groups choose one or more objectives that they wish to 
achieve. Individuals and groups develop a perception of the risk exposure associated with this situation 
(risk perception), influenced by the triple strand of conscious, subconscious and affective factors. 
Risk attitude is a chosen response of individuals or groups to a specific situation and the associated 
objectives, influenced by risk perception. Risk attitude influences the choice of risk thresholds and the 
nature of risk actions. 
Risk appetite is an inherent characteristic of an individual or group developed in relation to a specific 
situation and the associated objectives, influenced by the individual’s risk propensity and/or the 
organisational risk culture. 
Risk appetite is expressed via one or more measurable risk thresholds, which are quantified in terms of 
objectives. The span between the upper and lower limits of the risk threshold can be expressed as risk 
tolerances. 
Risk thresholds are derived from risk appetite and influenced by the chosen risk attitudes of 
stakeholders. They are validated against the overall risk capacity of the organisation, to ensure that it is 
not exceeded. If the total theoretical maximum of all risk thresholds is greater than the overall risk 
capacity, risk thresholds should be reviewed and modified. 
Risk actions are taken in response to the perceived level of risk exposure associated with the situation, 
driven by the chosen risk attitude. The results of those actions are evaluated against the defined risk 
thresholds to ensure that residual risk exposure remains below the threshold and within tolerance 
limits. If necessary the chosen risk attitude may be modified to support different risk actions, in order 
to maintain an acceptable risk exposure. 
